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1. Introduction 
In recent research we have studied the integration of economies, which we view as a merger 
of populations, and the consequent changes in social space and people’s comparison sets 
(Stark, 2013). Specifically, we have looked at the merger of populations as a merger of 
income vectors; we measured social stress by aggregate relative deprivation; and we showed 
that (except in the special case in which the merged populations have identical income 
distributions) a merger increases aggregate relative deprivation. We referred to this result as 
“superadditivity.” Given this increase, in the current paper we assess whether a budget-
constrained policy-maker can reverse the increase by means of an income redistribution that 
retains individual levels of wellbeing at their pre-merger levels. We show that such a reversal 
is not feasible; there is not enough of a gain to be skimmed off to compensate for the loss. We 
refer to this result as a general impossibility theorem. The theorem reported in the present 
paper goes beyond the examples set out in Stark (2010) and, as such, the result presented here 
supports the notion that the preliminary and specific finding reported in Stark (2010) is robust 
and general.   
When populations merge, the social horizons faced by the individuals who constitute 
the merged population change: people who were previously outside the individuals’ social 
domain are brought in. The (thus far six) successive monetary mergers of European countries 
constitute an example: the replacement of diverse currencies by a common currency brings 
about an instantaneous change in the comparison environment, expanding the reference space 
of individuals in a given country to encompass individuals from the adjoining countries. 
Although, prior to the introduction of the euro as a common currency, individuals in specific 
European countries were certainly able to compare their incomes with the incomes of 
individuals in other European countries, the comparison was not immediate. It required effort 
to convert incomes denominated in different currencies and was presumably not often 
attempted. Upon currency unification, the comparison environment changes instantaneously, 
enabling, indeed inviting, an easy comparison with others’ incomes. For example, workers 
who perform the same task and are employed by a manufacturer with plants located in 
different countries will be able to compare their earnings with each other directly, effortlessly, 
and routinely. 
How can a policy be designed to mitigate the heightened social stress? Policy-makers 
need only look around to appreciate the speed and ferocity with which social stress can 
cascade into social unrest. Naturally, it will be desirable to enact policies to ensure that 
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individuals’ wellbeing does not fall below its pre-merger level. Drawing on the example of 
the merger of a one-person population with a two-person population, Stark (2010) 
demonstrated that such a policy, which is a staple of public finance (a Pareto neutralizing 
transfer from the gainers to the losers), cannot be implemented. In the present paper, we 
generalize this “impossibility result” to the merger of populations of any size: the loss always 
outweighs the gain. In combination, the superadditivity theorem in Stark (2013) and the 
present paper’s impossibility theorem raise the specter of a dark side of the integration of 
economies that cannot be easily reversed.  
In Section 2 we present measures of individual and aggregate relative deprivation, and 
we restate the superadditivity theorem: the aggregate relative deprivation of merged 
populations is larger than or equal to the sum of the pre-merger levels of the aggregate 
relative deprivation of the constituent populations. In Section 3 we study a policy response to 
the increase in post-merger discontent. We show that an income redistribution which seeks to 
retain the pre-merger levels of wellbeing cannot be implemented, a general impossibility 
result. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. A measure of deprivation and the superadditivity of aggregate relative deprivation 
(ARD) with respect to the merger of two populations 
We measure the stress level of a population by adding the levels of stress experienced by the 
individuals who constitute the population. We refer to this sum as the aggregate relative 
deprivation (ARD) of the population. We measure the stress of an individual by the extra 
income units that others in the population have, we sum up these excesses, and we normalize 
by the size of the population. (A detailed exposition is in Stark, 2013). 
For an ordered vector of incomes in population P of size n ,  1,..., nx x x , where 
1 2 ... nxx x   , the relative deprivation of the i-th individual whose income is ix , 
1,2,...,i n , is defined as 
    
1
1
,i j i
n
j i
RD x x x x
n  
   (1) 
where it is understood that  , 0nRD x x  . To ease the analysis that follows, an alternative 
representation of the relative deprivation measure is helpful. Let  iF x  be the fraction of those 
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in population P whose incomes are smaller than or equal to ix . The relative deprivation of an 
individual earning 
ix  in population P with an income vector  1,..., nx x x  is equal to the 
fraction of those whose incomes are higher than 
ix  times their mean excess income, namely,  
      , 1 ( ) |i i i iRD x x F x E x x x x     . (2) 
A proof is in Stark (2013).  
The aggregate relative deprivation is, in turn, the sum of the individual levels of 
relative deprivation 
  
1
( ) ,
n
i
i
ARD x RD x x


 
1
1
n
n
j
j i
i
i
x x
n
 




 . (3) 
( )ARD x  is our index of the level of “stress” of population P.  
We now consider two populations, 1P  and 2P , with ordered income vectors  1 1ix x  
and  22 ix x  of dimensions 1n  and 2n , respectively. The total population size is 1 2n n n  . 
The ordered income vector of the merged population is denoted 1 2x x , and is the n-
dimensional income vector obtained by merging the two income vectors and ordering the 
resulting n components from lowest to highest. 
The following theorem states that the difference      21 2 1ARD x x ARD x ARD x   
is non-negative: a merger increases aggregate relative deprivation or leaves it unchanged. 
Namely, if we conceptualize the merger of two income vectors as an addition operator, then 
ARD is a superadditive function of the income vectors. (A function H is superadditive if for 
all x, y it satisfies ( ) ( ) ( ) 0H x y H x H y   .) 
Superadditivity theorem. Let 1P  and 2P  be two populations with ordered income vectors 
1x  
and 2x , and let 1 2x x  be the ordered vector of merged incomes. Then  
      1 2 1 2 0ARD x x ARD x ARD x   . 
Proof. See Stark (2013). 
Example 1: consider the merger of populations 1P  and 2P  with income vectors 
1 (1,2)x   and 2 (3,4)x  , respectively. The pre-merger levels of aggregate relative 
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deprivation are  1 1/ 2ARD x   and  2 1/ 2ARD x  . In the merged population with income 
vector 1 2 (1,2,3 4, )x x  , we have that      1 2 1 25 / 2 1ARD x x ARD x ARD x    . This 
example vividly illustrates further why a formal proof of the superadditivity result is needed. 
Even in the simple case in which the two populations do not overlap and a relatively poor, 
two-person population 1 (1,2)x   merges with a relatively rich, two-person population 
2 (3,4)x  , the overall relative deprivation effect cannot be pre-ascertained. In such a case, it 
is quite clear that upon integration members of the poorer population are subjected to more 
relative deprivation, whereas members of the richer population other than the richest are 
subjected to less relative deprivation. Because one constituent population experiences an 
increase of its ARD while another experiences a decrease, whether the ARD of the merged 
population is higher than the sum of the ARDs of the constituent populations cannot be 
determined without formal analysis. Put differently, in a setting in which others could only 
bring negative externalities, a smaller population will always experience less aggregate 
relative deprivation. But in a setting such as ours when others joining in can confer both 
negative externalities (of 3 and 4 upon 1 and 2) and positive externalities (of 1 and 2 upon 3), 
it is impossible to determine without proof whether the expansion of a population will entail a 
reduction in aggregate relative deprivation or an increase. 
 Because throughout we have kept incomes unchanged, the incomes of the members of 
a constituent population are not affected by its merger with another population: in our setting, 
a merger changes the social comparisons space that governs the sensing and calculation of 
relative income (relative deprivation), but it leaves absolute incomes intact. If we assume that 
individuals’ wellbeing depends positively on absolute income and negatively on the relative 
deprivation experienced, a merger leads to a deterioration in the aggregate wellbeing of at 
least one of the merged populations. 
We next ask how a government that is concerned about the wellbeing (utility) levels of 
individuals falling below their pre-merger levels and the consequent increase of the aggregate 
level of social stress will be able to respond in a cost-effective manner. Governments must be 
well aware that an increase in social stress could translate into social unrest, and there have 
been plenty of episodes, historical and current, to remind governments of the short distance 
between social stress and social protest. Clark and Senik (2010) reviewed data collected in 
2006/7 as part of Wave 3 of the European Social Survey. Their analysis of a usable sample of 
around 19,000 observations for 18 countries reveals that income comparisons are 
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acknowledged as at least somewhat important by a majority of Europeans; are mostly upward; 
and are associated with lower levels of happiness. When the merger of populations, in and by 
itself, exacerbates social stress on account of less favorable upward comparisons, 
governments will want to employ measures aimed at reversing the surge in stress.  
 
3. Policy response to the post-merger increase in ARD 
The unwanted effects of a merger on the wellbeing of populations and individuals call for the 
design and assessment of policies aimed at counteracting the increase in individuals’ distress. 
We consider the viability of a self-contained, non-publicly-financed policy aimed at 
preserving the wellbeing of individuals at its pre-merger level. We find, though, that a policy 
that seems to be attractive may not be implementable. 
We assume that the wellbeing of an individual is a function of his absolute income and 
of his relative deprivation, with the partial first derivatives being, respectively, positive and 
negative. Correspondingly, we define the preferences of the individuals in population P with 
an ordered income vector x as  
      , 1 ,i i i i i iu u x x x RD x x      (4) 
where 0 1i  , 1,2,...,i n . This form of the individuals’ utility function, in which the 
coefficients sum up to one, is equivalent to a social planner “giving” to an individual 100 
percent of weight that he can assign to income and relative deprivation in any way that he 
wants. Then, we can ascertain that each individual’s preferences enter the maximization 
problem with equal “importance:” the sum of the coefficients is constant for all individuals. 
The underlying idea of this policy response is to skim off income from those who reap 
a gain as a consequence of the merger, and to distribute that income to those who experience a 
loss, such that following the merger no individual will be worse off in terms of the utility 
measure defined in (4). There are several difficulties with such a scheme, however. 
First, a necessary condition is that there has to be at least one gainer. Without a gainer, 
there will be no surplus to tap. But as is quite obvious, there may not be any as, for example, 
when population with income vector 1 (1,2,3,4)x   joins population with income vector 
2 (5,5)x  .  
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Second, for the policy to be applicable, the policy-maker would need to know the i ’s. 
If each individual has his own distinct preference structure, the information required is 
colossal. Two possibilities then come to mind: that all the individuals share the same distaste 
for relative deprivation, or that they do not. We consider in detail the former possibility: 
i   ,  1,2,...,i i n  . 
That all the individuals share the same distaste for relative deprivation eases 
drastically the information requirements, allowing us to work with a single  . But then, even 
in the simplest configuration of incomes, impossibility strikes; Stark (2010) presents an 
example of this impossibility for the simple case of the merger of a one-person population 
with a two-person population. We next state and prove that what this simple case reveals 
generalizes to an impossibility that applies to the merger of any two populations with a 
uniform  . 
Impossibility theorem. A wellbeing-preserving “tax and transfer” scheme administered upon 
the merger of two populations and a uniform distaste for relative deprivation, 1  , 0 1  , 
cannot be self-sustaining. 
Proof. Let nR  be the space of n-dimensional vectors with non-negative components. We 
consider a population P  characterized by an ordered income vector   nix x  R , 
1 2 ... nx x x   , and a uniform distaste for relative deprivation represented by the parameter 
1  , where 0 1  . We first prove two auxiliary propositions, and introduce some 
necessary notation. 
Proposition 1. Let  1,..., nu u u  denote the vector of ordered wellbeing levels defined 
according to 
      , 1 ,i ii iu u x x x RD x x     , 1, ,i n . (5) 
Then, the ranking of the individuals by their incomes (from the smallest to the largest) is 
identical to the ranking of the individuals by their levels of wellbeing (from the smallest to the 
largest). In other words, the order of the individuals whose levels of wellbeing are 
components of the wellbeing vector u is identical to the order of the individuals whose 
incomes are components of the income vector x related to u,  
 j k j kx x u u    for all 1, , 1k n  , 1, ,j k n  .  
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Proof. Let j kx x . Because any individual who has a higher income is less relatively 
deprived than an individual who has a lower income, that is,    , ,j kRD x x RD x x , it 
follows immediately from (5) that j ku u . 
Furthermore, we seek to show that j k j ku u x x   . We do this indirectly by 
assuming j kx x . This implies 
        1 , 1 ,j k j j k k j kx x x RD x x x RD x x u u              ,  
which contradicts the assumption j ku u . This concludes the proof of Proposition 1. □ 
Proposition 2. For a population characterized by the ordered income vector   nix x  R , 
1 2 ... nx x x   , the population’s aggregate income is given by 
 
1
( 1)
( )
( 1) ( 1)
n
i
i
n n i n i
Y x u
i n i i n i  
   
  
      
 . (6) 
Proof. From Proposition 1 we know that j kx x  implies j ku u  for all 1, , 1k n  , 
1, ,j k n   where  1,..., nu u u  denotes the vector of ordered levels of wellbeing 
corresponding to the ordered vector of income levels  1,..., nx x x . In matrix parlance, the 
ordered vector of the individual levels of wellbeing defined by (5) can be represented as 
  
 
 
 
1
1
2
11 1
2
3
2 2
1 1
1
1
1
1
0
n
n k
k
n
n k
k
nn n
n k n
n n k n
x x
u x
x x
u x
u Bx
u x
x x
u x
 


 

 
  
 
          
     
        
     
        
    
 
 
 
, (7) 
where  
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       
     
   
1 1 1 1
2 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0
n
n n n n
n
n n n
n n
B
    
   
  



        
 
      
 
 
    
 
 
.  
Because for 0 1  ,  ij n nB b   is a full rank matrix, equation (7) is equivalent to x Cu , 
where  ij n nC B c


 1  with  
 
 
      
1
for 
1 1
for 
0 for .
ij
n
j i
j n j j n j
n
c i j
j n j
j i

 

 

     


 
 

 


  
The aggregate income of a population that is characterized by the ordered income vector 
  nix x  R  is then given by  
 
  
   
   
 
   
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
1 1
( ) 1
1 1
1 1
1
1 1
n n n n n n
i ij j ij j j
i i j j i j
n
j
j
n
j
j
jn
Y x x c u c u u
j n j j n j
n n
u
j n j j n j
n jn n j
u
j n j j n j

 
 
  
     


  
            
 
         
   
  
      
   


  
which is equation (6). This concludes the proof of Proposition 2. □ 
We next consider two populations, denoted by 1P  and 2P , characterized by the ordered 
income vectors  11 ix x  and  2 2ix x  of dimensions 1n  and 2n , respectively. These 
populations are merged, and we presuppose that some of the 1 2n n n   individuals thereby 
experience an increase in individual wellbeing, whereas others experience a decrease.  
Before proceeding, we introduce some notation. If  11 iu u , 11, ,i n , and 
 22 ju u , 21, ,j n , are the ordered wellbeing vectors related to the income vectors 
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 11 ix x  and  2 2jx x , respectively, that are merged, we can write the ordered merged 
vector of the pre-merged wellbeing levels as  
  (1) (2) ( )(1) (2) ( )1 2 , , , nnu u u u u u      ,  
where 1 2n n n  , ( )k  is 1 (or 2) if the k-th overall wellbeing level belongs to population 1P  
(or 
2P ), and ( )k  is the rank (from smallest to largest) within ( )kP  of this k-th overall 
smallest wellbeing level. 
Because (1)
(1)u
  is the smallest wellbeing level in the merged population, we have that 
  
1 2
1 1(1)
(1,1) if 
(2,1) other
, (1
wise.
)
uu
 

 

 
In order to express the other ( )
( )k
ku
  terms, we define 
  
1
1( ) 2
k
p
q k k p

   
and 
  2
1
( ) ,
k
p
q k p k

   
which are, respectively, the number of wellbeing levels from 1P  and the number of wellbeing 
levels from 2P  among the first k wellbeing levels of the merged population. Therefore, 
1(1) 1q   and 2 (1) 0q   if (1) 1  , and 1(1) 0q   and 2 (1) 1q   if (1) 2  . With this notation 
in place, the first 1k   wellbeing levels of the merged population are made up of 1( 1)q k   
wellbeing levels from 1P , and of 2( 1)q k   wellbeing levels from 2P . Obviously, 
)()( 21 kqkqk  . The ( )k terms and ( )k terms are therefore defined recursively as 
  
 
 
1 2
1 2
1 ( 1) 1
2
( 1) 11, ( 1) 1  if 
2,  ot
( ), ( )
( 1 herwise) 1 .
k q kq uk u
k
q k
q
k 
   
  




 

 
 We are now ready to prove the theorem itself. To avoid any decline in individual 
wellbeing, we transfer income to losers of wellbeing, taking away income from the gainers of 
wellbeing in order to finance the transfers. The resulting post-policy ordered income vector of 
the merged population, denoted by  ** *1 ,..., nx x x , **2*1 nxxx   , 1 2n n n  , 
characterizes a population in which - once the “tax and transfer” policy has been implemented 
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- no individual forgoes wellbeing due to the merger, that is,  ** ( )( ),k kku x x u  for every 
1,...,k n . We show that no self-financed wellbeing-preserving redistribution of incomes can 
exist by demonstrating that it is not possible for the aggregate post-merger income, 
   
1 2
1 2 1 2
1 1
n n
j k
j k
Y x Y x x x
 
    , to be equal to (or greater than) the post-wellbeing-preserving 
tax and transfer policy income,  * *
1
n
i
i
Y x x

  (except in one degenerate income structure 
identified at the end of the proof). 
 Let  
  ,
n l
e l n
l n l


 
, nl ,,1,0  .  
Using (6), we can express the aggregate level of income of the merged population after the 
wellbeing-preserving policy is implemented as1 
      * ( )( )
1
1, ,
n
i
i
i
n
Y x e i n e i n u
 
     .  
Then, the difference between  *Y x  and the sum of the pre-merger aggregate incomes of the 
constituent populations, is 
 
         
       
1 2
* 1 2 ( )
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1
1 2 ( )1 2
1 1 2 2 ( )
1 1 1
1, ,
1, , 1, , ( ) ,
n
i
i
i
n n n
i
j k i
j k i
n
Y x Y x Y x e i n e i n u
n n
e j n e j n u e k n e k n u f i u





 

  
      
            

  
 (8) 
where 
 
       ( ) ( ) ( )1, , ( ) 1, ( ),
( )
k k kn e k n e k n n e k n e k n
f k
   

          .  
We define the non-negative sequence ( )d k , 1, 2, ,k n , as 
 
(1)
(1)(1)d u

  and 
( ) ( 1)
( ) ( 1)( )
k k
k kd k u u
 
 

  , 2, 3, ,k n   
                                                 
1 Note that following the merger but prior to implementing the wellbeing-preserving policy, equality of the 
ordering of the incomes and of the pre-merger levels of wellbeing may not be preserved amongst the overall 
population, but after the implementation of the policy the ordering of the revised incomes  ** *1 , ..., nx x x  must 
again observe the ordering of the levels of wellbeing, allowing us to resort to Proposition 2 for writing the 
aggregate level of income of the merged population after the wellbeing-preserving policy is implemented. 
11 
 
to have  
 ( )
( )
1
( ) 0
i
i
i
k
u d k

  , 1, 2, ,k n ,  
and we are able to rewrite (8) as 
 
     * 1 2
1 1 1
1
1 2 1 1
1
1 2 1 2 1
1
1 1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
(1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
(1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( 1) ( ).
n i n n
i k k i k
n n n k
i k i i
n n n n k
i k i k i
n n n k
i k k i
Y x Y x Y x f i d k d k f i
d f i d k f i f i
d f i d k f i d k f i
f i d k d k f i
   

   

    

   
   
 
   
 
  
  
   
   
    
   
 (9) 
For the partial sums,  
k
i
if
1
)( , nk  , in (9) we get 
 
   
       
           
 
 
 
 
1 2
1 1
( ) ( )
1 2
1 1 2 2
1 1
1 2
1 1 1 2 2 2
1 1 1 2
1 2
1 1
( ) 1, ,
1, , 1, ,
0, , 0, ( ), 0, ( ),
( )1
1 1 ( )
k k
i i
q k q k
i i
n
f i e i n e i n
n n
e i n e i n e i n e i n
n nn
e n e k n e n e q k n e n e q k n
n n k n n q k n
n n n
n k n q k

 
  
  
 
 
    
           
               
 
     
   
 
 
 
 
  
        
2 2
2 2
2
2 1 1 2
1 1 2 2
( )
1 ( )
1 ( ) ( )
0,
1 1 ( ) 1 ( )
n q k
n q k
n q k n q k
n k n q k n q k


  
 
    
 
 
     
(10) 
where we used the facts that )()( 21 kqkqk   and that 21 nnn  .  
We note that, for 0 1  , (10) is equal to zero only if 0)()( 2112  kqnkqn , which 
is the case, for example, for nk   because then, 11 )( nkq   and 22 )( nkq  ; and that (10) is 
strictly negative if 2 1 1 2( ) ( ) 0n q k n q k  . In particular, 1 ( ) 0
n
i
f i

 . 
Using (10), we return to (9) and get 
 
     
 
 
   
1 1
* 1 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
21
2 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2
( ) ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( )
( ) ( )
1 ( 1) 0.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
n n n k n k
i k k i k i
n
k
Y x Y x Y x f i d k d k f i d k f i
n q k n q k
d k
k n k q k n q k q k n q k

  
 
     


       

   
     
     

 (11) 
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The inequality in (11) is not strict only if for each ni ,,3,2   such that 
( ) ( 1)
( ) ( 1)( ) 0
i i
i id i u u
 
 

    we have that 2 1 1 2( 1) ( 1)n q i n q i   , in which case  *Y x  will be equal 
to    1 2Y x Y x . This condition means that the two merged populations have exactly the 
same structure of incomes or, put differently, that apart from re-scaling, the structures are the 
same. Thus, if population 
1P  consists of 1k  individuals with income 1y , 2k  individuals with 
income 2y  and, in general, for any i , of ik  individuals with income iy , then population 2P  
consists of 
1rk  individuals with income 1y , 2rk  individuals with income 2y  and, in general, 
for any i , of  irk  individuals with income iy , where rQ  is such that irk Z  for any i . In 
this case, no transfer is needed to compensate for increased stress because such an increase 
does not occur at all.  
We thus conclude that as long as the just-described degenerate case does not apply, the 
aggregate post-(wellbeing-preserving) policy income,  *Y x , will always exceed the 
aggregate pre-policy income,    1 2Y x Y x . This completes the proof of the theorem. □ 
In sum: a “tax and transfer” scheme cannot achieve its aim because there is not enough 
of a gain to placate the losers while still keeping the gainers at least as well off as prior to the 
merger. In a way, this impossibility theorem is akin to the aggregate relative deprivation 
superadditivity theorem: here as there, welfare takes a beating. 
 
4. Conclusion 
An increase in aggregate relative deprivation is a downside to the integration of economies. 
To aid a social planner who seeks cost-effectively to counter this negative effect, we analyzed 
a policy measure in which individual levels of wellbeing are not allowed to fall. We showed 
that implementation of a self-contained “tax and transfer” scheme aimed at retaining 
individuals’ wellbeing at their pre-merger levels is not viable because there is not enough of a 
gain to placate the losers while still keeping the gainers at least as well off as prior to the 
merger. A governmental infusion of funds is needed, or the efficiency gains to be had from 
integration need to raise incomes sufficiently to facilitate an effective tax and transfer scheme. 
When the possibility of a merger is contemplated, an interesting question to address is 
whether the anticipated boost in productivity will suffice to pay for the cost of the policy 
discussed above.  
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